Moeketsi joined the street uprising against apartheid in the mid s at age ten, and soon took on a leading role. At the age of 13 he was expelled from school.
This suggests the series does not yet have focus - looking either at operations or at units - but then there is no real requirement for such focus. Maybe well the opposite.
Operation Dingo was - even to its proponents - an almost suicidal air-ground attack on two insurgent bases deep in Mozambique in Nov 2011 boer war Just Rhodesian Special Air Service and Rhodesian Light Infantry commandos, with such aircraft and helicopter support that was available, would attack 10 guerillas at their base at "New Farm" at Chimoio, some 90km into Mozambique.
The attack was set for November 23, the plan being a series of of air attacks followed by a parachute and helicopter assault heavily supported by air assets. The troops would move through the base, taking documents, some prisoners and arms and destroying the rest.
As it was, resistance and the the size of the base forced the commandos to stay overnight and withdraw the next day. Intelligence credited the base, some km inside Mozambique, with some inmates.
Wood, a master on the subject of the Rhodesian "Bush War", notes that estimates of the losses inflicted vary wildly, but a "figure exceeding casualties is realistic. I wanted to take a moment and commend you for the Africa War series. I am a political scientist at the University of California, Los Angeles, and one of my areas of research and teaching is conflict in the developing world.
Keep up the good work. Rhodesian SAS and RLI Rhodesian Light Infantry forces numbering soldiers supported by fixed wing and rotary wing assets armed with 20 mm cannon would be inserted 35 km inside Mozambique by parachute in order to inflict maximum damage and casualties.
Following exfill, they would then be reinserted three days later km beyond the border to repeat the attack at Tembue. Estimates of rebel forces were 10, at Chimoio and 4, at Tembue. The attack was an unprecedented success with ZANLA losses being estimated at 6, as well as huge intelligence and material losses.
Rhodesian losses were one aircraft, 2 dead and 12 wounded 8 by friendly fire.
The layout and presentation of the book is logical and of a very high quality. Woods provides a comprehensive overview of the regional environment and international climate Rhodesia was operating under an international embargo in order to provide context for the reader.
Additionally, he goes into detail regarding the initiatives and efforts that the Rhodesian government and military undertook to overcome the challenges that the international embargo had imposed upon them.
To this end, he discusses various innovations such as the Alpha bomb, the Golf bomb and the Flechette; each designed to augment their asymmetric capability utilizing easily obtained material. Rhodesia was faced with a number of challenges that demanded innovation.
Two factors served to drive the doctrinal development: Rhodesia was operating under a comprehensive international embargo. Additionally, comprehensive intelligence gathering techniques were implemented and the decision making process between the political and military branches was streamlined and shortened.
Nonetheless, this does not detract from the focus or quality of this book; it merely raises questions and the interest of the reader. Once the background has been painted for the reader and therefore the understanding of why such a risky and breathtaking operation was necessary, Wood focuses his attention on the planning and execution of the raids themselves.
The strength of the narrative comes through in this regard. This is particularly interesting because it displays the maturity of the joint capability of the Rhodesian Forces, honed after nearly 15 years of asymmetric warfare.
Additionally, the level of risk acceptance within the Rhodesian military and Government is noteworthy given the lack of depth of resources at their disposal and therefore the potential downside of failure.
The lessons and tactics of asymmetric warfare developed and learned through the Rhodesian experience form the basis of much of the joint operational doctrine used today. Dr Woods does an admirable job encapsulating the atmosphere under which the operation was conceived and executed.
Op Dingo represents one of the most stunningly, one-sided successes ever undertaken. A must for those wishing to understand the intricacies and challenges of this style of operation.
He has experience working with all elements including SOF.A Christmas pudding posted years ago to cheer up a sailor fighting in the Boer war, has turned up in the back of a kitchen cupboard, and been donated to the Royal Navy Museum in Portsmouth.
A number of interrelated factors led to the Second Anglo-Boer War. These include the conflicting political ideologies of imperialism and republicanism, the discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand, tension between political leaders, the Jameson Raid and the Uitlander franchise.
of results for "boer war" Showing selected results. See all results for boer war. My Reminiscences of the Anglo-Boer War (Illustrated) Nov 2, by Ben J.
Viljoen. Kindle Edition. $ $ 3 Get it TODAY, Nov Kindle Edition. by Bill Nasson. Paperback. $ $ 25 49 Prime. FREE Shipping on eligible orders. In Stock. South Africa, history, rulers, politics.
12 Mar Portuguese captain Bartolomeu Dias de Novaes first rounds the Cape. I have been fortunate to obtain the kind permission of Dr John Osborne to reprint a set of articles that he has written. John is the President of the New Zealand Society of Gunsmiths and is a wealth of information and knowledge, which I am grateful to be able to share.
Anglo-Boer War 2: The Battle of Renosterkop takes place between forces under Major-General Paget and Gen. B. Viljoen. This article was produced by South African History Online on Nov Support South African History Online Dear friends of SAHO.